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ON THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL
Clifford W. Smith, Jr.t
Over the past two decades, I have interacted with Henry Manne,
his organizations, and his ideas in a number of capacities. I taught
courses in finance and insurance in the Program for Federal Judges
offered by his Law & Economics Center. I attended the Law for
Economists program also offered by the Law & Economics Center. I
taught a course on the economics of organizations to law students as a
visiting professor at the George Mason Law School. And I studied
Henry's writings, especially those on the market for corporate control.
This interaction has been professionally stimulating and personally
fulfilling, especially the opportunity to teach the federal judges. It
was a forum quite unlike the courtroom: I was not selected and paid
to offer an expert opinion that might further a particular party's inter-
est; there were no jurors watching; there were ample opportunities to
explore issues both formally in class and informally afterwards. I
quickly developed a deep respect for the dedication and intellect of
our federal judiciary. Teaching in these programs also provided the
opportunity for interaction with other instructors-academics like
Armen Alchain, Orley Ashenfelder, George Benston, Pat Danzon,
Mike Jensen, Bill Meckling, George Priest, Dick Roll, and Paul Sa-
muelson. I will forever be grateful to Dean Manne for providing me
with these opportunities.
My central purpose here is to discuss Manne's scholarship. Le-
gal scholars widely acknowledge the pivotal role he played in the de-
velopment of the area of Law and Economics as a respected discipline
within legal scholarship and education. Professor Carney has done a
masterful job in reviewing these contributions.! I want to expand on
one point raised by Carney and then focus on the impact that this le-
gal scholarship has had on economics and finance.
Carney notes that Manne introduced economic reasoning to pro-
vide a positive analysis of corporate law. I believe this is a notewor-
thy contribution. In the 1960s, legal studies were primarily norma-
tive. Yet normative analysis ultimately demands a rich set of positive
t Louise and Henry Epstein Professor of Business Administration, William E. Simon
Graduate School of Business, University of Rochester.
1 See William J. Carney, The Legacy of "The Market for Corporate Control" and the
Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE NV. RES. L. REv. 215 (1999).
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theories. A positive theory provides an understanding of the conse-
quences of potential choices. Useful evaluations of legal rules are
virtually impossible without the explicit, or implicit, use of positive
theories.2 For example, one cannot decide which legal rule might be
better without first understanding the consequences of the alternative
rules, and this is precisely what a positive theory does. Thus, norma-
tive legal analysis really does not face a choice between a positive
theory or no theory, but between a carefully articulated, internally
consistent, ideally empirically verified theory, or a shoot-from-the-
hip, go-with-your-intuition "theory."
When I began my Ph.D. studies almost three decades ago, in my
first microeconomics theory class we worked our way through Paul
Samuelson's Foundations3 on an equation-by-equation basis. Con-
ventional microeconomic theory treated the firm as a black box that
transformed inputs (labor, capital, and raw materials) into output; the
amount of output produced from a given level of input was deter-
mined by "technology." Much of this analysis of the theory of the
firm focused on first- and second-order conditions for profit maximi-
zation.
Traditionally in this analysis, little attention is paid to the inter-
nal organization of the firm: whether decisions are centralized or de-
centralized; how specific tasks are bundled into specific jobs within
the organization; whether a given activity is performed within a de-
partment, a subsidiary, or is out-sourced; how transfer prices between
business units are set; how performance-evaluation systems are
structured; and how employees are compensated. In business schools,
where such questions are difficult to avoid, the analysis of organiza-
tional structure has generally been addressed in courses that have
their intellectual roots in psychology, not economics.
For economists to address these questions about the internal
structure of the firm, we have to open that black box and examine the
organizational architecture. By organizational architecture, I explic-
itly refer to three critical features of the firm: (1) the assignment of
decision rights within the firm; (2) the performance evaluation sys-
tem; and (3) the corporate reward system.4 Recognizing alternative
architectures, analyzing the incentives created by the alternatives, and
explaining the distribution of choices across firms have materially
enriched our understanding of these organizational decisions.
As far back as Hayek, economists have recognized that the
structure of an organization affects the information used in decision
2 See Michael C. Jensen, Organization Theory and Methodology, 58 Acr. REV. 319,
319 (1983) (arguing that positive theories are necessary for "purposeful decision making7').
3 Paul Anthony Samuelson, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1947).
4 See JAMES A. BRICKLEY ET AL., ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE: A MANAGERIAL
ECONOMICS APPROACH 4 (1996).
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making.5 For firms, a material challenge in discovering customer
demands while reducing costs is that important information for deci-
sion-making is generally held by many different individuals. Fur-
thermore, this information is often expensive to transfer. In such
cases, a decision-making process that requires that this information be
communicated to headquarters for approval is likely to be cumber-
some, resulting in lost opportunities.
A second complication is that decision-makers do not necessarily
have appropriate incentives to make value-increasing decisions, even
if they have the relevant information; there are agency problems.
Thus, the principle challenge in structuring firms is maximizing the
likelihood that decision-makers have both the relevant information to
make good decisions and the incentives to use the information pro-
ductively. Within firms there are no automatic systems either for as-
signing decision rights or for motivating individuals to use informa-
tion to promote the firm's objectives. These systems are created as
the architecture of the organization is established. For instance,
through the assignent of decision rights, employees are granted
authority over how to use company resources. But employees have
fewer incentives to use company resources efficiently than owners.
To help control such agency problems, the firm must develop control
systems-both a performance-evaluation system and a reward sys-
tem-to align the interests of the decision-makers with those of the
owners.
Except for very small firms, the CEO is unlikely to have the
relevant information for most major decisions. Consequently, the
firm faces three basic choices in designing the organization. First,
decision rights can be decentralized to individuals with better infor-
mation. This choice assigns decision-making authority to employees
with the relevant specific information. But this decentralization proc-
ess, which moves the decision rights to where the information is pro-
duced, gives rise to agency problems within the firm. Again, control
systems must be developed and implemented to manage these prob-
lems.
Second, the CEO can attempt to acquire the relevant information
to make better decisions. However, obtaining and processing the
relevant information can be quite time consuming and costly.
Moreover, in this process of centralization, which moves the infor-
mation to where the decision rights reside, texture in the information
is generally lost.
5 See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20
(1945) ("The economic problem of society is... a problem of the utilization of knowledge not
given to anyone in its totality.").
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Finally, the CEO still might make most major decisions even
without the relevant information. The benefits of this choice are
fewer agency problems among managers within the firm and hence
little need for a detailed internal control system. The costs of such
centralization, however, will come in the form of sub-optimal deci-
sions resulting from the lack of specific information.
In each of these cases, unless the CEO also owns the firm, there
are still agency problems between the owners and the CEO. Henry's
papers have played a particularly important role in highlighting im-
portant mechanisms for controlling this owner-manager agency con-
flict. His ideas on shareholders as specialized risk bearers in addition
to suppliers of capital, shareholder voting, the market for manage-
ment, and the market for corporate control have lead to a richer un-
derstanding of these mechanisms in controlling this basic corporate
incentive problem.
Tremendous progress has been made over the past few dec-
ades in developing a richer understanding of these organizational
details; progress that has occurred from the complementary efforts
of legal, financial, and economic scholars. I believe that it is
noteworthy that so much of this analysis was produced by scholars
in law schools and business schools rather than economics depart-
ments.6 Scholars in professional schools appropriately operate at a
lower level of abstraction than our colleagues in arts and sciences
departments. For example, we see the same thing if we contrast
research in an engineering school with that in a physics depart-
ment. Our students' chosen careers require them to deal with this
institutional detail. This, in turn, creates a derived demand for
such analysis by both law and business school scholars.
6 The most notable exception to this proposition appears to be the Economics Department
at UCLA with Armen Alchian, Harold Demsetz, and Jack Hirshleifer. Yet, their attention to
these institutional issues was apparently spurred in important ways by their association with the
RAND Corporation.
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